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Travels in Diplomacy: V.S. Srinivasa Sastri and G.S. Bajpai
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ABSTRACT
In April 1921, V.S. Srinivasa Sastri was appointed as India’s representa-
tive to the Imperial Conference in London. His secretary was a young
Indian Civil Service officer, G.S. Bajpai. Over the course of the next two
years, the two Indians travelled together as India’s diplomatic represen-
tatives to London, Geneva, Washington, Australia, New Zealand and
Canada. The young Bajpai and his ‘chief’ developed a loving bond that
was to remain strong for the rest of their lives. These travels, as I will
show, were very crucial to the making of India’s pre-eminent diplomat
in the interwar years, Sastri, and the country’s foremost foreign policy
bureaucrat at independence, Bajpai. But the afterlives of these journeys
were also to manifest beyond their personal/political lives. These two
years were formative to the making of Indian diplomacy in general and
to India’s response on the questions of race and the commonwealth in
particular. This essay will follow Sastri and Bajpai as they travel together
as ‘diplomats’ and map the ways in which they came to ‘learn’ the con-
duct, expectations and execution of diplomacy.
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Introduction
In the sweltering, moist April heat of Poona in 1921, Valangaiman Sankaranarayana Srinivasa
Sastri, a prominent Indian liberal leader, was delivering a speech at the Deccan Sabha. Seated in
the audience was a 29-year old civil servant, Girija Shankar Bajpai.1 The young bureaucrat had
been plucked from the United Provinces, and assigned to Sastri as his private secretary for the
Imperial Conference scheduled to be held that summer in London.2
Lord Chelmsford, the outgoing Viceroy, had chosen Sastri as a delegate, largely on account of
the latter’s reputation as ‘the Silver-Tongued Orator’.3 That afternoon in Poona, Bajpai found out
for himself the measure of Sastri’s oratory. He informed his family friend and another prominent
liberal leader, Tej Bahadur Sapru, that the latter’s praises on his moderate colleague’s ‘mastery of
diction, beauty of manner, mellifluousness and charm of utterance’ barely did him justice. Sastri’s
style of ‘restrained phrase and invincible logic’ was far superior to the ornate and impassioned
manner of delivering speeches of even veteran rhetoricians.4 In this glowing review, Bajpai prog-
nosticated further on what Sastri’s oratory meant for their upcoming tour.
Oratorical performances were key to any diplomatic success. However, Bajpai noted, the logic
of what made a great speech in diplomacy had measurably changed. The stirring of passions,
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the signature move of all great orators of pre-World War era, was slowly disappearing. In the
new scientific age, where matters of war and peace were resolved over arguments held to public
accountability, rather than privately arrived through cunning, reason triumphed over passion.
The arguments and speeches, reproduced in newspapers across the world and catalyzing public
perceptions and mood, required reasoned, rational arguments which could slid through early
excitements into long memory. Consequently, public discourse was increasingly framed by an
appeal to logic, rather than to passion. Sastri, Bajpai surmised, appealed to the new age of public
speaking and was ‘destined to triumph’ at the imperial conference. 5
Over the next 18months, the two Indians traveled together to the United Kingdom,
Switzerland, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada on official tours. They were
the first Indians to travel so widely in quasi-diplomatic capacity as representatives of the Indian
government. And, in these journeys, while Bajpai’s prognosis on his elder colleague held true,
the tour was also important for generating a shift in the developing praxis of the
Commonwealth. The Commonwealth, as we will discuss, was both a political form as well as an
ideational aspiration. As a political form, the Commonwealth was merely an advance over the
movements for an ‘organic unity’ of the empire, which explicitly endorsed white supremacy.
However, in aspirational terms, the Commonwealth paid affirmative nods to a limited multi-racial
polity. It fell on a non-white diplomat like Sastri, with Bajpai in tow, to navigate the wedge that
separated the politics and the aspiration; and maneuver the nascent Indian diplomatic practice
in directions which were to shape India’s diplomacy in the decades to follow.
The first section of this essay will contextualise these travels within the contours of an emerg-
ing order. Indian diplomacy, of which this tour becomes the inaugurating move, emerges in the
developing relationship between the transformation of India’s internal struggle and the trans-
formation of the commonwealth/international context. In the second section, we will follow
Sastri and Bajpai across the world, witnessing how the two experienced, learnt and conducted
the task of diplomacy. The third section on the afterlives of this tour will attempt to explore the
ways in which these tours help us to think through the continuities of Indian diplomacy from
colonial to postcolonial times.
Indian diplomacy and the Inter-War world
Conventional accounts of international society alert us to its expansion after the First World War.
The incorporation into the League of Nations of countries from Latin America, Asia and Africa as
equal members indicated a move towards democratization of the international society. The new
egalitarianism was inscribed through Woodrow Wilson’s impressive call for self-determination
which encouraged the colonized populations to hope for quick routes to independence. But as
several critical works have shown, Wilson was doubly quick to undermine than to proclaim the
same ideal. His idea of self-determination was deeply circumscribed, racialized and counter-revo-
lutionary.6 Indeed, it served not to advance but to further restrict the sovereign claims of non-
western nations. As Adom Getachew argues in the case of Ethiopia and Liberia, the League of
Nations imposed ‘burdened sovereignty’ on these otherwise independent countries, as the sover-
eign rights of these countries were further curtailed. She calls it ‘mandation by other means’.7
For India, however, the experience was somewhat the opposite. India became a member of
the League (and subsequently of several other international organizations), which was a conse-
quence of India’s recognition as an equal member, alongside the self-governing dominions at
the Imperial War Conference of 1917. Importantly however, India was not granted a self-govern-
ing status internally. The Montford Reforms of 1919 acknowledged ‘responsible government’ as
the aim of reforms, but against the expectations of Indian leaders did not grant India self-
government. More so, the reforms also did not confirm a timeline as to when India could expect
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to achieve self-government. So, what motivated India’s elevation to the high table of diplomacy,
without fulfilling the fundamental criterion of self-determination or self-governance?
The answer lies in the transforming landscape of the British Empire itself. During the First
World War, as Britain found itself relying greatly on its dominions and India for support, the calls
for imperial decentralization became increasingly vociferous. Consequently, the post-War empire
was reimagined as a ‘Commonwealth’. Ideas for what the Commonwealth meant differed from
dominion premiers like Jan Smuts to imperial constitutionalists like Lionel Curtis, 8 but essentially
all of them sought some form of decentralization as well as a recognition of the equality of its
self-governing constituents. The empire was hierarchical in its imagination of political organiza-
tion, which the Commonwealth sought to recraft as a network of affinities between political
communities, centering around certain core ideals.9 This new conception of the British
Commonwealth of Nations was also required to be sufficiently different from other empires, fed-
erations and commonwealths (America, for instance) of the time, as well as from earlier iterations
of the imperial ideals such as Greater Britain, Imperial Federation and the Organic Union.
Lionel Curtis’s was perhaps the most sketched out ideal of the Commonwealth.10 Although
his scheme made a range of analytical and empirical observations about the transformation of
the Empire into a Commonwealth, two key ideas stood out. The foundations of the British
Commonwealth, he argued, were not contractual but sacramental. In other words, the
Commonwealth was a political community joined not by a transactional social contract between
its constituents and the Sovereign – as political philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, John
Locke and Rousseau would argue – but rather a sacramental bond. An innate sense of duty
towards each other, represented in the Sovereign, joined the political communities. Each political
constituent cared for the other, and took on concomitant responsibilities for the welfare of
others and the political community as a whole. Consequently, the political institutions within the
Commonwealth were designed to uphold the duty of other-regarding welfare. The basis of the
autonomous political units coming together in the British Commonwealth was neither a matter
of expedience nor of self-interest, but of care for the interests of the others in the political
community.11
This other-regarding duty came with an important caveat – it could only be undertaken by
those who were mature and responsible enough to carry its burden. In other words, immature
(read: non-white, colonized) political communities which could not be given the responsibility of
governing themselves, let alone making decisions for others, were ideally excluded from the gov-
erning functions. However, the only way to cultivate the sense of duty, Curtis argued, was to
practice it. Indeed, the best way to develop the sense of duty among the less advanced constitu-
ents was to introduce them, in measured fashion, to these responsibilities. Indeed, he would
argue that the very purpose of this Commonwealth was twofold: to raise those who were yet
unable to share this duty within the Commonwealth, and to continuously expand its reach out-
wards to bind the whole of humanity.
In this Christianity-inspired sacramental conceptualisation, Curtis allowed for the possibility of
non-white populations becoming part of the Commonwealth.12 So, for instance, if India – the
‘most advanced’ among the colonies – is to be eventually raised to a fully self-governing
member of the Commonwealth, it was imperative that India be included in imperial
decision-making.13
Making India an equal participant with some Indians as representatives would acknowledge
not only India’s advance under the British rule, but also serve the pedagogic function of training
Indians to participate in imperial matters. Importantly, India’s inclusion would also demonstrate
that the sole criterion for inclusion into the high table was political advance and not racial dis-
tinction, Curtis argued. This was an indication to other non-white members that the ‘standards
of civilization’ within the empire entertained the future possibility of their inclusion.
Regardless of Curtis’s specious conceptual spin, the reasons for India’s inclusion were also
pressing. As imperial decision-makers were often reminded, with 75 per cent of its population,
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India was what made the empire an Empire.14 The country had contributed immensely to the
war effort and that support had been secured during the war with promises for greater equality
in the post-War era. Having fought alongside the British in the War, Indians had asserted their
claims to equality. India had shown, as Indian leaders and even the government of India argued,
that it was no more a dependent of, but partner in the Empire. Indian leaders demanded the
removal of the ‘badge of inferiority’ and to be raised ‘in the scale of nations’.15 The uprising in
Ireland and the revolution in Russia which had bolstered Indian revolutionaries also increased
the salience of the primarily moderate Indian leadership who could be placated with reforms
and imperial equality.
Another key concern, perhaps the most important consideration in India’s elevation, was the
inevitability of the notoriously racist white dominions having a say in imperial governance and
consequently matters relating to Indian affairs. As Sastri wrote in an important pamphlet, this
would make India a ‘household drudge’ of the empire, and a ‘humiliation’ that Indians would
not brook.16
While granting ‘self-government’, as Indians had demanded, was out of question – although a
reform scheme promising a move towards responsible government were introduced – equal rep-
resentation at the imperial table to British-ruled India was easier to yield for the British govern-
ment.17 Preceding the Montford reforms, India was included as an equal member of the British
Empire at the Imperial War Conference of 1917. This implied a juridical equality with the white
dominions as far as imperial politics was concerned, and subsequently at the international level.
This disparity between India’s international and internal status made India an international
anomaly, as several scholars have pointed out.18 A sovereign country that strives for international
legitimacy is not entirely uncommon, but a colony with international status is rare and indeed
anomalous. However, several Indian nationalists saw this quasi-international status for a non-self-
governing colony as an empty gesture. Indian nationalists, including Nehru, were dismissive and
thought of India’s international equality as a farce.19 India may have been an equal member of
the international society in juridical terms, but substantively not so much because it was the
British Raj and their interests, and not Indians, who were represented.
However, the binary of juridical versus substantive presence misses the complex ways in
which the international and the domestic intermingled. First, juridical international status was
seen as an important, non-retractable, signal from the British Empire towards the actual grant of
dominion status to India. In other words, the grant of dominion-like equality at the international
level implied a guarantee of Britain’s commitment towards speedy reforms. This was one of the
reasons why Indian liberals, for instance, remained convinced that even though the Montford
reforms fell considerably short of self-government, a dominion status was an inevitability.20
Indian grievances, when placed in the context of Britain’s troubles in Ireland and the announce-
ment of the Irish Free State in December 1921, confirmed to the Indian liberals the British gov-
ernment’s reluctance to pursue any militarily costly option even for India.
Furthermore, diplomatic equality, beyond being a status-gaining exercise and a commitment
move towards internal reforms, also granted an important voice to the country in shaping anti-
racial policies in the empire. On the issues of racial discrimination, especially when it came to
the discrimination against Indians overseas, Indian diplomats exercised considerable agency in
influencing empire-wide discourse and policies. Having gained a seat at the high table seat
alongside the dominions, Indians used platforms such as the imperial conference to marshal the
emerging idea of the Commonwealth to their advantage.
Third, the juridical versus substantive divide, while conveniently sidetracking the contributions
of inter-war Indian liberals, also misses on the story of the emergence of Indian diplomacy.
Sastri-Bajpai tour, which we turn to now, was an early iteration of Indian diplomacy, which
helped not only to lay the foundations of the Indian diplomatic practice but also, for years to
come shaped India’s position on key aspects of post-independence foreign policy, such as on
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race and the commonwealth. Crucially, the key Indian diplomat in this period, Sastri, embodies
the form and content of the origins of diplomacy.
The journeys
London and Geneva
On 16 April 1921, Sastri and Bajpai left Bombay for London on the SS Kaiser-e-Hind.21 Sastri was
already scheduled to proceed to London as a member of the Railways Committee, when the
Viceroy asked him to stay on longer for the Imperial Conference, planned to start in mid-June.
Sastri’s choice as India’s representative was crucial, and in that Bajpai’s remark about his public
speaking was not wide of the mark. As an observer was to recount at the end of the 1920s, the
First World War saw the rise of the ‘scholar-statesman’ (sic). The War had been thrust upon the
world by short-sighted politicians, who often clad themselves in military attire. It was now left to
the ‘scholar-statesman’ with ‘his high character, his liberal culture, and persuasive force and
humane sympathies’ to lead the world back to peace. Woodrow Wilson in America, Tomas
Garrigue Masaryk in Bohemia, Herbert A.L. Fisher and Arthur Balfour in England, Gustav
Stresemann in Germany, Aristide Briand in France, Benedetto Croce in Italy, among others, had
furnished ‘a lofty direction and a beneficial purpose’ to public life. No wonder, the scholar was
‘raised to exalted positions of power and prestige’. Sastri, with his ‘profound knowledge of men
and things, a wide experience of public life, a remarkable intellectuality and moral eminence, a
rare gift of speech, and above all, a high character, and an inspiring personal example’ belonged
to the same group of scholar-politicians.22
However, Sastri’s appointment as India’s representative was not merely because of his schol-
arly disposition and forceful oratory. The Gandhi-led nationalist movement had galvanized itself
into a strong political force with mass support. After briefly accepting the 1919 Montagu-
Chelmsford reforms, the Congress had rejected them to demand swaraj (self-government) and
gone on to launch a non-cooperation movement. Sastri, in contrast, had not only been a crucial
supporter of the Montford reforms, but had also contributed to their drafting. Although by no
means an uncritical supporter of the government, Sastri, like his mentor Gopal Krishna Gokhale,
followed the path of constitutional politics. The two Gokhale protegees, Sastri and Gandhi, repre-
sented the two emerging poles of non-violent politics in India. With Gandhi’s fame on the rise
even abroad – he was now regularly compared with Jesus Christ, for instance23– the British gov-
ernment were interested in projecting Sastri as India’s counter-voice to Gandhi.
Sastri, the diplomat, could also be projected as a living tribute to the success of the civilizing
mission. He was a native leader who was not a puppet of the government, neither was he
overtly keen to appear as a ‘brown saheb’. He had indeed made his name through speeches
which were highly critical of the government. Someone who could meld the sagely disposition
of an oriental intellectual with the openness of a western mind, who could quote from Burke to
Valmiki with equal ease, and despite critiques of colonialism accepted the advances it brought,
was an ideal representative of India as well as the British rule. The purpose of colonialism is
sometimes prematurely considered to be the making of ‘mimic men’. However, quite contrarily,
it is in shaping the native into an ideal product of the intermixture of colonial-colonized cultural
interface – blending their exotic charm with a hospitable cheeriness – where colonialism finds its
raison d’être.24
However, the rituals of diplomacy also demand an outgoing, social personality, one that Sastri
lacked. Travelling together on the ship, Bajpai observed Sastri from a closed, personal space: the
latter’s shyness and reticence, and inclination to avoid social occasions, was a troubling trait for
a diplomat. Bajpai wrote, that ‘[i]n the circles in which [Sastri] will soon have to mingle social
charm counts for as much as intellectual power or political sagacity’.25 This is also where the
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younger Indian saw his opportunity. His efforts at ‘humanising’ Sastri, started at the ship itself; as
he pushed Sastri to attend social gatherings.
When the two landed in London, the Imperial Conference was still two months away. The
main issue at the Imperial Conference was going to be the Anglo-Japanese Treaty and the future
constitution of the British Empire, or the now preferred term, the British Commonwealth. From
India’s point of view however, the key issue was the racial ill-treatment of Indians across the
British dominions, especially in South Africa. Sastri had identified securing the rights of overseas
Indians as his main mission and accordingly prepared a resolution for the Imperial Conference.
Sastri and Bajpai conducted a series of discussions with the India Office on the issue. India
Office, who Bajpai described ‘an extra-cautious body of men who are apologetic even when
claiming what is no more than due to India’,26 insisted on toning down the language of the
resolution. But Sastri was determined not to let the issue get diluted at the hands of the India
Office mandarins. He did a series of interviews and speeches on the issue of overseas Indians to
create enough noise to make it harder for the dominions as well as the agenda drafters to
ignore. Bajpai dragooned a reluctant Sastri into several social functions which offered opportuni-
ties for ‘making informal but very useful political discussions’27. They managed to successfully
place the issue on the agenda, although it could only find an entry at the bottom end of the
pecking order.
By the time the Conference started in mid-June, the Indian delegation had done considerable
background work. The main opposition to the Indian position was expected to come from the
South African Prime Minister, Jan Smuts. Against someone of Smuts’ stature, the Indian delega-
tion needed every opportunity to cajole, caress and persuade other delegations as well as the
London political elite. Bajpai also arranged a series of meetings for Sastri with the dominion
prime ministers, including with Smuts. These meetings proved helpful to assess the barometer of
opposition. Sastri and Bajpai had cultivated networks in the London elite and social networks,
and through them attempted to influence public opinion, scoped out the possibilities of com-
promise with Smuts as well as with other dominion prime ministers.
Sastri’s speeches at the conference, pushing for the rights of Indians, were both memorable
and substantive.28 Acknowledging the right of the dominions to frame their policies with regard
to the composition of their populations, he asserted India’s equal status and consequently the
right of Indian subjects to enjoy the same rights as every other imperial subject, irrespective of
where they were in the empire.
Importantly, what he demanded was not the same rights as whites on the basis of human
rights, but a form of sovereign equality within the Commonwealth. Hence, this was a matter of
juridical equality not abstract justice. His placing of the argument on the basis of sovereign
equality and not explicitly on racial equality, which would have antagonized the white domin-
ions, left his opponents with little argumentative critique. Even Smuts agreed on the matter of
principle, but expressed his inability to sign on the resolution citing South Africa’s ‘exceptional’
circumstances. Eventually, the doggedness of Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for India,
and Sastri on the issue paid off as Indians were able to pass a resolution asserting the equality
of Indians in the Empire. South Africa had abstained from – importantly, not opposed – the reso-
lution, which signified how successful the Indian delegation had been.29
For Bajpai, as he acknowledged in a letter, the Conference was a tremendous learning experi-
ence. He noted how Smuts, even though representing a small country, was imperious in all dis-
cussions of the Empire. In contrast, Indians spoke only on the issues that were relevant to India.
Bajpai wrote that Indians needed to learn from Smuts. The latter’s propensity to speak on every-
thing, contrasted against the reluctance of Indians, raised the profile of his country in the imper-
ial scheme of things. As both Sastri and Bajpai found out in the proceedings of the Conference,
despite a clearly good case, Smuts was hard to beat because of the support he got from people
like Churchill at the Imperial Conference. Even someone like William M. Hughes, the Australian
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Prime Minister who held grudges against the South African prime minister, prevaricated several
times on the question of equal rights to the Indians.
From London, Sastri and Bajpai were dispatched to Geneva to represent India at the second
League of Nations Assembly. At the Assembly, Sastri made another striking speech, where he
counselled the Assembly – being the more democratic forum than the Council – to take more
initiative. The Assembly was representative of the ‘citizens of the world’ and hence it was ‘bound
to act in the interests of all the others’ and not merely the strongest powers. He also called for
democratization of the functioning of the League Secretariat.30 India paid nearly 5 per cent to
the League’s expenses, and yet had only 1 representative in its secretariat. This contrasted
sharply with 138 from Britain, 73 from France and 13 from America which wasn’t even part of
the League. Towards the end of the speech, to the great annoyance of the British delegation, he
called out the fellow empire delegation member South Africa for racial discrimination. Speaking
on behalf of the non-white people of the world, he said that the South African colour policy, if
also applied to its mandate in South West Africa, would mean that ‘we are worse off under the
trustees of the League than we were under the Germans’.31
The speech was a sensation, hailed by one and all as the most impressive in that year. The
British delegation as well as South Africa’s delegates were displeased that Sastri had raised an
internal issue of the British Commonwealth at an international platform. However, Sastri held
that at the League the Indian delegation was not subordinate to the British delegation and the
criticism of South Africa was justified.32
In the Committees, Sastri faced the seasoned Chinese diplomat, Wellington Koo, on the ques-
tion of opium. Koo, who doubled as the President of the League’s Council that year, had intro-
duced a resolution which prohibited the illicit production, manufacture and trade in opium. But
he had also influenced the Council to set aside a recommendation from the advisory report to
appeal to the Chinese authorities to take concrete steps to curtail opium production. In effect, as
Bajpai wrote, Koo wanted the world to shut its eyes to the irregularities in the production of
opium in China, while embarking on a ‘holy and humanitarian crusade against its use’ in every
other country.33 Sastri objected that this was a convenient sidestepping of rules. If the League
deliberately overlooked China’s failures to live up to its own promises, it would be failing in its
duties. Koo ‘negotiated, bullied and threatened us with constitutional difficulties’ wrote Sastri.
But Sastri remained firm and convinced the sub-committee to go against the Council’s President.
The final report asked the Chinese government to take appropriate measures to combat the
smuggling of opium. Sastri’s strong response made quite an impression – a French delegate
commented that Sastri was ‘a great orator, with knives’.34 He was ably aided by Bajpai in dissem-
inating India’s position, eventually giving India a crucial diplomatic victory over China.35 Bajpai
noted that the League served as ‘a valuable field for international advertisement’ and Sastri’s
popularity at the League convinced him that India ought to make more of such platforms.36 The
more Indians spoke on these platforms and the more issues they spoke on, the more the coun-
try’s stature would rise.
Washington
As soon as they returned from Geneva to London, Sastri was appointed as India’s plenipotentiary
for the Washington Naval Conference. He insisted on taking Bajpai along. The Conference was
convened by the recently-elected American president William Harding to discuss two broad
themes – disarmament and the new order emerging in the pacific with the rise of two major
powers, the US and Japan. Harding’s initiative was partly inspired by the desire to reinsert
America into global affairs after the disastrous League of Nations policy of his predecessor
Woodrow Wilson, which had been voted down in the Senate – Harding being one of the voters
against it. Harding’s approach to world peace was disarmament rather than the creation of
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toothless international institutions. The Conference itself had stimulated varying reactions. The
Washington Times sought comments from three leading minds of the time: the writers H.G. Wells
and George Barnard Shaw and the inventor-cum-businessman Thomas Edison. Shaw was the
most pessimistic. Refusing an invitation to come to Washington, he declared the Conference a
sham with little hope of any lasting peace. Edison concurred that permanent and complete dis-
armament, as the Conference aimed, was hardly a possibility. Wells was more optimistic, and
had travelled to Washington to report on the Conference. The Conference would either be ‘a
turning point in human affairs’, or would be ‘one of the last failures’ before the ‘disasters and
destruction that gather our race’, he wrote.37
Both Sastri and Bajpai witnessed the American Secretary of State, Charles E. Hughes, make a
historic bull-in-a-china-shop speech on 12 November 1921, where he proposed to massively cut
down on the naval capacity of each country. The British soldier-turned-correspondent Charles
Repington, who coined the term First World War, noted that at the end of his half hour speech,
Hughes had consigned a total of 1,874,043 tonnes to scrap, considerably more than ‘all the
admirals of the world have destroyed in a cycle of centuries.’38
Observing from the main table sitting diagonally across from Hughes, Sastri was highly
impressed with the approach taken by the American delegation. To his audience back in India,
he called Hughes’ speech a ‘capital stroke’ which presented a ‘cut and dried proposal’.39 He
noticed that the public opinion had been worked up in such a manner that any opposition to
American proposals was sure to invite the opprobrium of the masses. The negotiating parties
had been caught by surprise and pushed into a corner. The main question had been ‘decided
beyond recall’ and only the details were left to be debated, Sastri wrote to his brother.40 With
this, the old diplomacy of ‘euphemisms and concealments, … periphrasis and indirectness, its
mystifications and long-drawn delays’ was dead, ‘long live the new’, wrote Sastri.41 On behalf of
India, Sastri signed the treaties in Washington.
For India, the value of this conference was less substantial and more symbolic. Sastri was sent
as India’s plenipotentiary, and this was the first time an Indian delegate would have the sole
power to sign international treaties on India’s behalf. However, this came with a rider. The British
feared that at the Conference, if things did not go their way, the Japanese would introduce a
resolution on race just as they had done at the League of Nations. Sastri, a known critic of
racism within the Empire, would vote with Japan. Hence, even with plenipotentiary powers,
Sastri was asked to regularly consult with the Secretary of State, Edwin Montagu, in London.
Bajpai sent weekly reports to India Office from Washington.
Nonetheless, to Sastri, the participation of India as an autonomous actor was a striking proof
of international equality, especially with the white dominions. This meant, he emphasized in his
speeches, that a full dominion status was not too far. In the weeks of the Conference, Britain
was also negotiating with the Irish leaders, and the accord which was eventually reached in
December 1921 was a sign that an autonomous status for India was also in the offing. Asserting
his own independence from the British delegation, Sastri warned the British that if India was not
granted a dominion status in near future an Ireland-like situation was likely. 42 In the conference
per se, India had nothing substantial to contribute to the discussions on the matters of
disarmament.
Although frustrated at the irrelevance of India at such gatherings, Bajpai was benefitting from
the Conference as a student of diplomacy – his third international conference in a row. To Tej
Bahdur Sapru he wrote:
… I am gathering experience in Washington. I meet interesting people every day and see how foreign
policy is fashioned. … Nothing of much interest to India has yet come up. I doubt very much whether it
ever will. Our presence here is more valuable as affording a training in diplomatic methods and as
constituting a recognition of India’s right to participate in important international conferences… 43
The Washington Conference was also, however, indicative of the shift of the epicenter of glo-
bal power from Europe to America. Bajpai was convinced that India ought to have a consular, if
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not diplomatic, representation in important world capitals, but most importantly in Washington.
The dominions already had them, and so should India. But this was not just a matter of
‘sentimental rivalry’ or symbolic claim. Hundreds of Indian students came to the US, and almost
all of them were:
… in the clutches of Irish Americans. Their political outlook is distorted. They magnify India’s grievances in
their own minds and then paint them in the most lurid colours before Americans where the prejudice
against Great Britain is as intense as their ignorance of India is profound. Without any effective counter-
propaganda, anything that these young “patriots” say is easily swallowed and rapidly digested.44
Two decades later, Bajpai would return to Washington as India’s first Agent General to the
United States where one of his primary duties was to counter the nationalist view against British
rule in India. He wrote articles in the American press criticizing the nationalists. In one of the
articles, he cryptically called his future boss Nehru ‘the Hamlet of Indian politics’.45
The dominions
Sastri and Bajpai returned to India in March 1922, just after Gandhi’s arrest following his suspen-
sion of the non-cooperation movement. Sastri and Bajpai were to proceed again in two months
on a tour of the three dominions – Australia, New Zealand and Canada – which now attracted
strong nationalist critique.
Many argued that with several leaders including Gandhi in jail, a leader of Sastri’s stature was
needed in the country in this crucial phase.46 Indian radicals called him ‘a self-seeking unjust
agent of a tyrannical alien government’ who had continued to participate in government com-
mittees and delegations during the non-cooperation movement.47 Sastri basked in the glory of a
‘pretentious diplomatic coup’, while being entirely disconnected with the wishes of the people.48
Bombay Chronicle editorialised that Sastri pleaded for the just and humane treatment of the
nationals of every other country except his own.49 A sympathetic writer noted ‘a miasma of hat-
red, bigotry, suspicion and slander’ against Sastri in the nationalist press. He was called ‘the Esau
of Indian politics … who sold his birthright for a mess of pottage’.50 Even the more sympathetic
avenues like the Indian Social Reformer questioned Sastri’s ‘political reverie’ in assuming that a
tour to the dominions would affect any change.51
Remarkably however, it was left to Gandhi and his close followers like Banarasi Das
Chaturvedi and Henry Polak to defend Sastri publicly.52 Gandhi stated that his and Sastri’s love
for each other wasn’t lessened a bit, even when the latter thought Gandhi was ‘leading India
down to the abyss’.53 Chaturvedi wrote in the Lucknow paper, Leader, that it was a pity that no
Indian leader of prominence went to the dominions to see the condition of Indians overseas,
and those who go were weakened by ill-informed critiques of intolerant friends.54 Polak critiqued
those who argued that India could only help overseas Indians if the country had swaraj. He
reminded them that Japan was an independent country, and yet could not ensure the equal
treatment of its citizens.55
Thus, the stakes on the success of Sastri’s mission were even higher. Bajpai, was anxious for
him: ‘I … hope [Sastri] would achieve some measure of success in his mission. Soft words alone
will not satisfy our people or silence his critics. … We ought not to return empty handed’, he
wrote.56 To his own daughter Sastri wrote:57
… I maintain that this mission cannot be delayed. Its reaction, if rightly guided, on India’s advance, is
considerable. It can only be estimated by those who have the imagination to see the subtle ways in which
political action is controlled by the convergent currents of thought from different parts of the Empire. The
Washington Conference is a triumph of the world’s public opinion. More and more every day in the future,
England’s policy will be moulded by American and Dominion sentiment. If Lajpatrai says it, people call it
wisdom, if I say it, they call it selfish.
From June to September 1922, Sastri and Bajpai travelled across the three white dominions of
Australia, New Zealand and Canada. They covered all the provinces except Tasmania in Australia
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in over a month of travel. They spent four weeks across the north and south islands in New
Zealand.58 In Canada, while much of their political concerns were limited to British Columbia,
they also spent considerable time in Ottawa, Toronto and Montreal. This tour had been arranged
to canvas support among the lawmakers in the dominions for pro-Indian legislations in local par-
liaments. However, the tour also had a broader public diplomacy mandate. Sastri was expected
to create a broader sympathy for the Indian cause among the dominion publics.59
Steeped in what Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds call, the ‘religion of whiteness’, the white
publics in the dominions were notoriously prejudiced, which meant that Sastri’s was an already
impossible task.60 However, Sastri’s mission was limited in the sense that he did not appeal
against the anti-Asian immigration measures which had been considerably hardened for non-
whites, but to push for the political and civic rights of those Indians who were already legally
inside these dominions. These included not only the question of franchise for Indians in most
cases, but also other issues such as old age pensions.
Sastri’s recent performances in London, Geneva and Washington had raised expectations in
the dominions. An Australian publication referred to him as ‘our first great racial ambassador’
who ‘moves in an orbit that transcends the conventional limits of international diplomacy’.61
Beyond the immediate task of ‘seek[ing] our understanding and cooperation’, Sastri’s mission
was significant with a view towards ‘forg[ing] some tangible and material links in the bonds
which … will ultimately unite in amity the Eastern and Western civilisations’.62 Most analysts
viewed him in relation to Gandhi. While Gandhi led a movement against British rule in India,
Sastri, they unfailingly noted, was pro-Empire. As a columnist in Victoria Daily Times emphasized,
Sastri was different from the ‘fanatical types’ like ‘Gandhi and his associates’. His ‘personal
accomplishments, provide[d] … an assurance that there is potential material upon which to
build India’s case for autonomy’. Moderate both in temperament and political views, Sastri was
‘an exact type to whom the British government thinks India must look for its ultimate liberty’.63
His public speeches were greatly anticipated and much successful. In them, he pleaded for
India’s equality in the empire, not as a concession but as a matter of right. It was incumbent
upon the dominions, including Australia, to provide equal rights to the Indians already resident
in their countries.64 In Melbourne, he asserted: ‘We … ask you for nothing but equality. You
dare not, you cannot, and I know, you will not, deny it.’65
His tone was even shriller in Canada:
Neither Britain nor any Dominion can afford to play bully with India any longer, and we in India, let me tell
you once for all, are determined to be bullied no longer. If we are going to be equal partners with the rest
of the Empire in the maintenance of peace, we will contribute what we can to its might, strength and
majesty, for we have a contribution to make to the world, and we are prepared and willing to make it
under the Union Jack, if the Union Jack is going to bring us the maintenance of self-respect, and our own
sense of honour. Otherwise, much as we should regret it we must seek our political salvation outside of this
great political organization.66
Sastri’s speeches evinced varying reactions among his target audiences. One West Australian
reader called him the ‘Lloyd George of India’, 67 while the newspaper hailed him for his
‘memorable eloquence’.68 The Chronicle called him ‘one of the most remarkable personalities in
India and in the wider sphere of world politics.’69 Another listener in Adelaide noted that ‘[h]e
asks very little, simply for his countrymen to be allowed a vote. Why should we not grant it? No
just objection can exist.’70 The Australian premier, William Hughes, affirmed that India’s case had
‘gained in weight by the eloquence and reasonableness with which it had been urged’.71 In the
New Zealand Parliament, his speech was hailed as ‘the most perfect example of public speaking
heard for many years in the Parliament building’. 72 In Canada, The Vancouver Sun noted his
‘world fame as an able statesman’.73 Leon Ladner, the Conservative Party representative from
Vancouver, wrote that the speech had an important effect on public opinion in the notoriously
anti-Indian British Columbia. The success of his speech could be gauged from the fact, he wrote
privately to former premier Arthur Meighen, that none of the anti-Asian organisations and
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complainants had criticized Sastri, even though his speech was published verbatim in most of
the newspapers.74 His meetings were well attended and enthusiastically reported. Bajpai cabled
the India Office that ‘by his eloquence, sanity and moderation’ Sastri had created a great
impression.75
However, these rousing receptions and high praise came wrapped in a patronizing stereo-
types as well as cautionary warnings. One writer, A.G. Stephens, argued that Sastri’s fame came
not from a objectively impressive command over the English language, but the wonder that an
Indian could speak so well. Sastri could not compare with ‘Cobbett’s standard of eloquence’, but
it was his brown skin that made his listeners wonder – “how the dickens it got there”.’76 Sastri
was manifestly an exception, whose conduct ought not be seen as an argument for granting
rights to Indians.
This argument of Sastri’s exceptionalism, repeated in all the dominions, generated three sorts
of arguments. The first argument, which Sastri himself endorsed was that through his personality
Sastri was able to show India’s higher culture to the dominion publics, a side they had not yet
seen. The argument had strongly casteist connotations: the immigrants to the dominions, most
of whom were engaged in either trade or labour, came from allegedly lower castes in India.
More visits by high cultured and caste Indians will give a better impression of Indians to
the dominions.
Sastri himself noted in his report, that ‘[t]he average citizen of a Dominion still regards India
as a land of mixed poverty and splendour, barbaric in outlook and aspiration as well as in mag-
nificence. He has had no opportunity of meeting Indians in refinement and culture, without
which it is impossible to dissipate the phantom of superiority born of an imperial appreciation of
Indian capacity’. 77
The second argument, used by white opinion makers in the dominions, summoned Sastri’s
exceptionalism to argue that it should not blind the dominion leaders to the average Indian
who was unlike Sastri. One conservative politician in Canada argued that 90% of Indians in
Canada were ‘low caste Hindus, filthy morally and physically, and extremely ignorant with
respect to our political ideals’, and he had personally not known a single Indian of ‘the Sastri
type who obviously are truly British’. Precisely the fact that Sastri was an exception should be
enough indication of why more Indians could not be allowed in. Witholding political and civic
rights from Indians, conservative leaders argued, disincentivized their immigration into Canada.
The third reaction was an acknowledgement of Sastri’s strong arguments, but placing the
question of Indian in the dominions within the larger context of immigration politics. If Indians
were granted political rights as British subjects, this would then have to be extended to other
naturalized British subjects of East Asian origin in these dominions, such as the Japanese and the
Chinese. A Canadian newspaper editorialized that the granting of franchise to Indians would
result in ‘a thin edge of the wedge’, i.e. something that may be unimportant in itself like a small
hole in the dyke of Whites Dominions. It had the potential to burst open a large hole for making
political rights imminent for other Asian migrants.78 Furthermore, others emphasized that the
real target was South Africa where Indians were in larger numbers.79 An Evening Star writer cau-
tioned against Sastri’s ‘stirring appeals to abstract justice’, arguing that New Zealand may afford
to take a lenient stance on Indians, but in situations such as in Natal in South Africa where
Indians outnumbered whites by almost 36 percent it was unreasonable to ask whites to grant
equal rights to Indians. Urging New Zealanders not to fall ‘under the spell of the charmer’, the
writer noted that Sastri, a man of high culture and impeccable standards, was indeed an excep-
tion to Indians in general, in particular to those who emigrated to other parts of the Empire.80
These reactions allow us to tease out what appears to be an important coincident, but
requires deeper reflections: Indian diplomacy emerges exactly at the moment at which Indian
emigration of labour, in the form of indenture as well as for other working class professions, is
legally barred. Between 1913 to 1922, India passes several legislations, banning emigration of
labour.81 The new overseas Indian, in the dominions as well as in Kenya, whose rights Indian
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diplomats are primarily fighting for in an empire where political rights are still largely based on
property rights, is the mostly savarna, propertied Indian, who in professional terms could be
identified as the trader and the soldier. The Indian is no more the ‘coolie’, the derogatory term
used for Indians. Sastri (and Bajpai), as the cultured upper caste Indian, is not just the representa-
tive but also the embodiment of the new Indian the dominions could expect. The debate in the
dominions then is not whether the overseas Indian could be granted rights, but whether the
overseas Indian does indeed match Sastri’s standard. As a diplomat, Sastri becomes the model
‘sankritised’ Indian and the putative subject of those rights.82
Sastri’s mission had varying degrees of success in the three dominions. The Australian and
New Zealand governments granted some legislative concessions. The Australian Prime Minister
wrote to Sastri: ‘You have brought within the range of practical politics a reform but for your
visit would have been most improbable, if not impossible, of achievement’.83 It took two more
years for Indians to be granted franchise at the dominion level, although by then Hughes was
already out of power. Queensland granted the franchise to Indians in 1930, and Western
Australia in 1934.84 In New Zealand, the disabilities faced by Indians were minimal. Indians had
only two specific complaints: they were excluded from receiving old-age pensions, and they had
difficulty in securing employment. In the case of the former, no Indian resident in New Zealand
was old enough to be considered eligible for the Old Age Pensions Act (and this was to remain
so for many years). Since it was not a pressing matter, the New Zealand government informed
Sastri that no amendments were proposed. Discriminations against Indians on social security
were eventually removed in the late 1930s.85 With regard to the employment of Indians, Sastri
observed that the while there was societal prejudice against Indians (although much less preva-
lent than Australia), the government as such took a stronger stance against discrimination faced
by Indians in employment schemes.86 The New Zealand government also agreed to relax two
specific provisions on the New Zealand Immigrations Restrictions Act of 1920, which were
restrictive towards Indians. In Canada, Sastri received promises of concessions and noted a ‘a
softening of prejudice’. Bajpai was also of the view that they had been ‘successful beyond
expectation.’87 But both overestimated their efforts. Indians in British Columbia were only able to
gain franchise in 1947.
But, as Sastri emphasized, the more significant aspect of his tour was that this was the first
instance when India had sent an accredited representative to directly negotiate with the domin-
ions on matters of mutual interest. India could now rightfully claim an international identity,
which in turn had an enormous constitutional significance. By establishing India’s international
credentials, the case for granting dominion status as well as self-government to India had been
considerably strengthened.
British policies had become increasingly susceptible to pressures from America and the
dominions, as apparent in the recent grant of Dominion Status to Ireland. The case for dominion
status for India was strengthened if the publics in the broader white world were sympathetic to
India, he argued.88 With regard to the rights of Indians in the dominions, although he did not
expect immediate results, he believed that considerable groundwork had been done to create
awareness about the issues faced by Indians in the white dominions. 89 The political education
of white publics and leaders, which he thought was his main mission, would contribute to better
relations with Indians in the dominions.
Afterlives
The Indian Social Reformer carried a critical but sympathetic assessment of Sastri’s dominion tour.
Mr. Sastry (sic.) writes: “I am not hopeful of immediate results; but of the ultimate success of continued
efforts I have little doubt.” There is a good deal too much of such “vacant chaff well-meant for grain” in this
report. Mr. Sastry must have been conscious of it, as he finds it necessary to lay stress on the educational
values of his tour. We do not doubt it. Failures are often of more educative value than success.90
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It is unreasonable to expect a wholesale change in dominion policy from one tour, and Sastri
tempers his own aims in the report by emphasizing its educative value. Without going into
whether this must be qualify as a success or a failure, we can turn to the important gestures one
can make about tracing potential future trajectories of the Sastri-Bajpai tour.
Bajpai’s letters provide an indication of the formative influence of this tour, not least on his
convictions about spreading India’s diplomatic footprint. The Commonwealth as an idea had a
significant hold on him for the rest of his career, including during his years as Nehru’s chief for-
eign policy mandarin after independence. As the recently deceased K.S. Bajpai – himself an
exceptional diplomat for India – noted in an oral interview about his father, the Commonwealth
had come to be ‘an article of faith’ for G.S. Bajpai. Despite its contradictions on race, Bajpai had
an innate regard for the Commonwealth as fundamentally informed by enlightenment values.
Bajpai’s early tour of the dominions had played a crucial role in his lifelong commitment to the
ideal. He went on to play a most crucial role in India remaining within the Commonwealth, and
not taking the Irish route out of it. K.S. Bajpai specifically noted the deep influence these early
tours and the networks his father mingled in had on the senior Bajpai’s, and consequently
India’s, willingness to remain within the Commonwealth.91
Eventually the Commonwealth that Nehru, Bajpai and India acceded to was the one which
Sastri had played an important role in shaping. Sastri realized that the empire needed new
clothes, and that imperial enthusiasts were looking towards the Commonwealth as being the
replacement term but had an awkward relationship with racial equality. The Commonwealth as
an ideal was accommodative, to some extent, to include non-white members in schemes of
imperial governance. But it elided any discussions on racial inequality which caused the hierarchy
in the first place, assuming the hierarchy to be inscribed by social Darwinian ideas of civiliza-
tional progress.
Sastri is entrepreneurial in his negotiation of the race-question within the Commonwealth
ideal. It is important to recognize that he does not make it an issue of human right. Aware of
the excessive sensitivities of the dominions with regard to their sovereign claims within the
British Commonwealth, he couches India’s claims with twin logics of a commonwealth equality
within and a difference from without. In other words, he argues that India was a sovereign equal
within the commonwealth which meant that Indians across the empire would need to be given
exactly the same treatment as other Europeans. But, to the objections that white dominions had
with regard to opening the racial dyke for the Japanese and Chinese, he would argue that the
Indian claims to equality as a member of the commonwealth cannot be compared against simul-
taneous claims of the Japanese and the Chinese who were not members of the Commonwealth.
Focusing on sovereign equality also allows him escape the obvious contradiction of his racial
equality with regard to others within the empire, such as the Africans. Africans could not claim
for rights because they or their nations did not yet have a semblance of sovereign equality.
This claim of sovereign equality within the commonwealth has important consequences for
India’s subsequent diplomatic positions. A few years after this tour, Sastri and Bajpai were in
Cape Town as part of a delegation to negotiate a bilateral agreement with South Africa. Known
as the Cape Town Agreement of 1927, the Agreement was the first ever bilateral agreement
within the empire/commonwealth without any involvement of Britain. The Agreement came
soon after the Balfour declaration of 1926 which established that the United Kingdom and the
dominions were ‘equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their
domestic or external affairs’.92 Even though India was not included in the Declaration because it
was not a self-governing dominion, the Cape Town Agreement became the first agreement that
embodied and affirmed the principle of sovereign equality within the Commonwealth that Sastri
had asserted in his tour.93
However, the Commonwealth was also shaped by Sastri’s ideals in other important ways. The
popularization of the idea of British Commonwealth could be credited for a large part to the
Round Table (especially Curtis) and Jan Smuts. However, Sastri was able to masterfully point to
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the inconsistencies of the ideal of the British Commonwealth and its racialized practice, without
dismissing the whole ideal. Sastri responded to the mainstream interpretations of the
Commonwealth ideal through a sustained rational, rather than just rhetorical, critique of their
arguments. In the process, he articulated a vision for the British Commonwealth that might not
be profoundly original, but was strikingly nuanced as well as novel in the setting of an imperial
conference and the dominion tour. As Hugh Tinker argues, Sastri’s Commonwealth was eventu-
ally also more enduring than Curtis’s or Smuts’, as a coloured commonwealth replaced a white
commonwealth.94 Indeed, his authorial claims on conceptualizing the British Commonwealth are
as strong as those of Curtis and Smuts.
The issue of racial discrimination against Indians obviously came to assume increasing import-
ance from this point onwards. Racial equality was a key aspect of post-independence foreign
policy. At the United Nations in 1946, India raised the issue of racial discrimination against South
African Indians for the first time, and played a crucial role in delegitimizing racial discrimination
in the post-Second World War world order. 95 Sastri and Bajpai’s tour was not only an important
precursor to this history, but crucially also shaped the terms of India’s diplomacy.96 What is often
missed in post-independence histories of India’s efforts against racial discrimination is that until
1962 – when the anti-apartheid resolution made racism specifically a matter of human rights –
India’s opposition against racism used the sovereign equality argument. India had argued that
racial discrimination against Indians contravened India’s sovereign agreement with South Africa
in 1927. In other words, the right to equal treatment was due to South African Indians because
the South African government had consented to it in a bilateral commonwealth agreement, and
South Africa’s reneging on the agreement was a potential cause of conflict.97
In conclusion, we can only flag two other points which need greater elaboration in full scale
studies of their own. First, in placing the origins of Indian diplomacy in this crucial moment of
transformation from the identity of the overseas Indian, we become more attentive to the caste-
inflections of Indian diplomacy. And second, at a time when Indian diplomacy is on an overdrive
in justifying a citizenship amendment bill, that classifies potential citizens on the basis of religion,
and combined with a National Register of Citizens discriminates against Muslim minorities
already living in the country, it goes against on its own rich history of fight against discrimin-
ation and support for passive resistance against registration certificates by Indians overseas.
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